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
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
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STUDENT ESSAY

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TO THE RIGHT OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES G. MANNING, JR., AD

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two solutions being offered. The one receiving the greatest amount of Congressional support requires economic sanctions and proposes complete disinvestment. The premise is that if enough financial pressure is exerted, the government will end its discriminatory practices. Opponents argue this would only cause hardship for the black population and lead to more violence. They propose the United States continue its efforts to bring about reform through the policy of constructive engagement. This policy, however, has been applied in a manner that favors leftist regimes in Southern Africa and is punitive to South Africa. The policy of constructive engagement should be scrapped and a concerted effort made to assist in bringing about change in South Africa through a policy of presence.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

TO THE RIGHT OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
5 March 1986

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR(S): James G. Manning, Jr., LTC, AD

TITLE: To the Right of Constructive Engagement: An Alternative Approach Toward South Africa

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The basic question is how can the United States best persuade and assist the South African government end apartheid without forcing the country into the hands of a pro-Soviet regime. Racial segregation has been the way of life in South Africa for more than three hundred years. Since the Truman administration there have been continuing efforts by the United States to have the South African government ease its apartheid policies. Unfortunately the methods used have done little to change the situation. There are presently two solutions being offered. The one receiving the greatest amount of Congressional support requires economic sanctions and proposes complete disinvestment. The premise is that if enough financial pressure is exerted, the government will end its discriminatory practices. Opponents argue this would only cause hardship for the black population and lead to more violence. They propose the United States continue its efforts to bring about reform through the policy of constructive engagement. This policy, however, has been applied in a manner that favors leftist regimes in Southern Africa and is punitive to South Africa. The policy of constructive engagement should be scrapped and a concerted effort made to assist in bringing about change in South Africa through a policy of presence.

Author

**TO THE RIGHT OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA**

A combination of circumstances has focused the attention of Americans and the Congress on apartheid in South Africa as never before since racial separation became that country's official policy in 1948. Media attention began concentrating on the Free South Africa Movement's daily picketing and civil disobedience campaign at the South African Embassy in Washington in November 1984. The arrest of several congressmen and other prominent Americans, the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu for his work against apartheid while he was visiting the United States, and the escalation of black unrest coupled with violent government repression has made South Africa a daily news event.

Racial segregation has been the way of life in South Africa since 1652 when Dutch working for the East India Trading Company arrived to establish a resupply station for ships using the Cape route enroute to and from the Dutch East Indies. Between 1650 and 1700 there was an influx of Dutch, French Huguenot, and German immigrants who began to expand to the North and Northeast. The few native Africans in the area either migrated northward or intermarried with the Europeans. As those forebears of today's Afrikaner moved to the Northeast, they eventually came into contact with Bantu tribes who were in the process of migrating toward the South. During the 1700 to 1775 timeframe the migrating Bantu and the white pioneer farmers, or trekboers, clashed in pitched battles with many casualties on both sides. In 1795, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British arrived and took temporary possession of Cape Town with permanent possession of the entire Cape Province following in 1806.

In the early 1800's there was a steady wave of British immigration. The Boers resisted British rule, continued moving to the northeast, and fought the Bantu as they went. By the mid-1800's what is now South Africa consisted of two independent Afrikaner republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, the British-ruled Cape Colony and Natal Province, and a few territories populated by African tribes.

The discovery of gold in 1866 and diamonds in 1870 caused a rush of immigrants from all over the world. Britain attempted to establish authority over the Afrikaner Republics eventually leading to the Boer War. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed as part of the British Commonwealth. It was at this time that a law was passed precluding blacks from owning land in areas designated for whites. All facilities were segregated, and blacks were treated much like they were in the United States before the civil rights movement.

In 1948, however, the conservative Nationalist Party, the party of the Afrikaner which had long been subservient to the more liberal parties, came into power and took a very hard line on segregation. The Nationalists drew up laws enforcing segregation and made "apartheid" or apartness the way of life in South Africa. Even so, up until South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth in 1961, there were legal rights for blacks. However, black unrest coupled with Communist infiltration of black organizations and an emergence of black power factions created fear in the white communities. In order to blunt the black liberation movements the Nationalist Party took action that virtually eliminated all rights for black South Africans.

Today virtually all control over national affairs is held by the country's five and a half million whites, who are divided 60 percent Afrikaner to 40 percent of other European backgrounds--predominantly British. Afrikaans and English are both official languages, and there are a multitude of cultures and attitudes depending on whether one is English, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Greek, German, Jewish or a white refugee from a former Southern African colony such as Rhodesia.

Between blacks and whites politically, economically and socially are almost three million coloreds of mixed black-and-white descent and somewhat over three quarters of a million Asians.

During the early 1970's, in an effort to solve the racial problem, a tragic attempt at social engineering was conducted. Ten tribal homelands were established. The theory was that blacks, who now number 23 million, were members of district tribes, each with its separate historic and cultural background, and should not be considered citizens of South Africa. Each black was declared a citizen of his designated tribal homeland, even if he never lived there. The homelands were to have internal self-government and eventually independence. The homelands are comprised of only 13 percent of what is without doubt some of the poorest land in the country. About half of the blacks live in the homelands and half in townships that grew up next to the cities. The government has used a system of identity cards to control who may live outside their homeland.

As far back as the Truman administration, there were efforts by the United States to have the South African government ease its policies of apartheid. The concern even at that time was the possibility of a civil

war resulting in South Africa falling into the hands of a government that would be pro-Soviet.

The Kennedy administration went into office committed to bringing black Americans into the mainstream of United States society. With the emphasis on racial justice at home, our foreign policy could only be expected to follow suit. The degree to which that occurred, however, came as a jolt to the South Africans. A nation which considered itself pro-Western and staunchly anti-Communist and which had continuously demonstrated support for the United States by its voting record in the United Nations was stunned in late 1963 by the US vote in the United Nations condemning South Africa for its continuing control over South-West Africa and our support of the United Nations voluntary arms embargo against the Republic.

Even though the Johnson administration was preoccupied with Vietnam, the "Great Society" had to move forward, and periodic condemnation of the South Africans fit quite well with Johnson's domestic policy.

During the Nixon-Ford eras there was a shift in relations with South Africa, but as in previous administration it was tied to politics at home. As Nixon sought support from southern conservatives, relations with South Africa became more amicable. There was a softening of our positions in the United Nations, and even planes, helicopters and communications gear were sold to South Africa.

While on an African tour in 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger spoke in Lusaka, Zambia. Even though the speech indicated to the South Africans that they would have time to make economic and social

reform, the following excerpt set the tone for the United States position on apartheid:

Of all the challenges before us, of all the purposes we have in common, racial justice is one of the most basic. This is a dominant issue of our age, within nations and among nations. We know from our own experience that the goal of racial justice is both compelling and achievable. Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a matter of foreign policy, but an imperative of our own moral heritage. . . . Here in Lusaka, I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa--in the name of moral principle, international law, and world peace. . . .¹

The Carter administration came into the White House with a concern for human rights and a particular desire to change South Africa's apartheid policies. It is not an overstatement that the Carter administration was openly anti-South African. United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young's referral to the South African government as racist and illegitimate reflected the prevailing attitude of the Carter administration. Vice President Mondale, in a meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna, referred to "full political participation," but failed to define the term. At a later press conference he acknowledged that "one-man-one-vote" was an interchangeable term. A 1978 embargo on the sale of equipment to the South African military further strained relations. These and similar actions focusing primarily on short-term problems by the Carter administration only caused the South African government to harden its attitudes towards black political freedom.

The assessment of the Reagan administration was that President Carter's human rights policy had severely strained the relationship of the United States with the South African government. It was decided that a new approach was in order, and after several months the administration implemented the policy of "constructive engagement" under the leadership of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker.

In the view of the administration constructive engagement would focus on how to acquire the influence needed for blacks to participate in a genuine bargaining process acceptable to both blacks and whites. Considering that power in South Africa was in the hands of a friendly anti-Communist country, the United States would employ commercial and economic leverage as its weapons and use diplomatic channels to press for black political freedom. The policy also sought to encourage security throughout the region. One would have expected the main focus of constructive engagement to have been a concerted effort to improve relations with the South African government in order to end apartheid. However, as the policy evolved, the concern for change focused on pressuring South Africa to grant independence to Namibia in accordance with the charter and various resolutions of the United Nations.

Let us now focus more closely on our relationship with South Africa and the issue of apartheid. First, what has been the opinion of the American public?

Harris polls conducted in 1985 revealed that the majority of Americans were opposed to any type of economic sanctions against South Africa. Even though three out of four people surveyed were opposed to apartheid they believed economic sanctions would hurt blacks and

probably just wouldn't work. The people surveyed indicated they preferred diplomacy over economic sanctions for encouraging change in South Africa. On the other hand by almost the same margin they believed that American companies in South Africa should actively work to change apartheid. Concerning disinvestment, 76 percent were opposed to forcing US businesses out of South Africa. This in fact reflects that American opposition to economic sanctions is now greater than it has been in the past.

Even though the majority of Americans oppose economic sanctions, Congress, apparently in response to the vocal leftist anti-South African lobby and pressure from its own Black Caucus, recently made a decision to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. In order to head off harsh sanctions in the form of legislation, President Reagan announced on 9 September 1985 several measures to be implemented by executive order. These measures included a ban on computer exports to South African security forces and law enforcement agencies. Nuclear goods and technology cannot be provided, except for health and safety reasons or for nuclear proliferation safeguards. Loans cannot be made to the government unless used for the purpose of improving housing, health or educational facilities that are open to South Africans of all races.

In addition the President took action to ultimately ban the import of Krugerrands and increase by a substantial amount money provided for scholarships and other aid to black South Africans. He also urged all American companies operating in South Africa to subscribe to the Sullivan Principles and instructed the American Ambassador to South Africa to make efforts to get all United States companies in South Africa to adopt them.

These sanctions appear to have been implemented in much the same manner as the rest of the policy of constructive engagement and the South African policies of previous administrations--a knee jerk response to provide a short-term fix rather than rational calculations designed to achieve a clearly specified result over the long-term.

South Africa's regional policy of applying the appropriate pressures on her neighbors in order to prevent them from aiding and abetting the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas, coupled with strengthening economic ties throughout the region can only be deemed successful.

The diplomatic agreements South Africa signed with Mozambique and Angola in the spring of 1984 may have fundamentally realigned the interstate relations of the region. The Nkomati accord pledged Mozambique, in effect, to expel the African National Congress (ANC), the main organized opposition to apartheid, from its territory and to work in conjunction with South Africa toward this end. In exchange, Pretoria agreed, in effect, to halt its support for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) . . . a guerrilla movement challenging the Maputo government. The Lusaka agreement commits the government of Angola to prevent the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) from using its territory as a base for attacks into South African-controlled Namibia and, like Nkomati, includes provisions for active cooperation with South Africa to achieve this aim. In return, the South Africans agreed to withdraw their military forces from Angolan territory, a portion of which they had been occupying for several years.²

The Nkomati accord is probably the most important of the two for South Africa since it will have an immediate and long-term effect on the ANC. The Lusaka agreement does not address the ANC, and nothing precludes Angola from supporting it or South Africa from assisting Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). There is little doubt that South Africa will continue to support Savimbi

at the present rate or even increase aid substantially in order to pressure Angola. With the success gained through the Nkomati accords South Africa will likely push for similar agreements with all of her immediate neighbors. In fact South Africa announced that it had previously signed similar secret agreements with Swaziland. These agreements will take a great deal of external pressure off the South African government and allow more time for the solution of political and racial problems at home.

Peace between South Africa and her neighbors would undoubtedly strengthen the economic ties between them and result in greater economic development throughout the region. It is indeed in South Africa's best interest to have neighbors with viable dynamic economies tied directly to South Africa's, which would then be the economic mainstay of the entire region.

During the past three years there have been many changes away from apartheid. There are, however, members of the conservative wing of the Nationalist Party who would as soon turn back the clock and return to apartheid in its strictest sense. This would undoubtedly trigger a black response that would result in widespread unrest, increased guerrilla activity and demands for immediate political change. In response harsh repression could be expected. Under these conditions the ANC and her sister organizations would flourish, and the door would again be open for the Soviets and Cubans in the region. It would probably take a long period of time, but the country would eventually be involved in a bloody civil war. In the end the government would change hands with the ANC in all likelihood well established in the new government. Since Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader, has already stated,

We are grateful to the Soviet Union . . . we will not forget those who helped us at the hour of our greatest need. As for those who are against us now, you could hardly expect us to give them preferential treatment³

the Soviets could well end up with a friend and basing rights in the most strategic spot on the continent of Africa.

The present government, under the direction of State President P. W. Botha, is committed to insuring that the previous scenario does not become a reality. Fortunately the present leadership realizes the mistake of the homelands issue as evidenced by Mr. Botha's statement made during a speech to parliament on 19 June 1985. "I do believe in participation without domination. Other leaders of South Africa and I agree that we cannot force communities into artificial units against their will. . . ."4

The negative response of the black community to the recent attempt at solving the problem by restructuring the government and giving coloreds and Asian representation caught the government by surprise. The fact that the change aroused the ire of the blacks is not, however, as important as is the fact that the white South Africans were willing to make such a change. Even though the new constitution did not give blacks the representation they are seeking, it was a radical move for the South African government.

In the recent past the government has made concessions in other areas as well. The small business development corporation is being funded to assist in establishing businesses in non-white communities. At the same time rules and regulations that served as stumbling blocks to black property ownership are being changed. The government has

increased spending for black housing while accepting the principle of black ownership of property in urban areas outside the homelands. Houses inside the homelands are being sold to blacks for a fraction of their value.

The government hopes that ownership will create a feeling of having a stake in the country and will assist in creating a black middle class which wants to preserve the system. Electricity has been brought to the townships, and the government is working to provide fresh drinking water, sanitation and roads. Laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage have been repealed. Black labor unions are not only allowed, they have real bargaining power. There is an ongoing effort to improve education for blacks, and although there is still a wide gap between educational quality blacks and whites, that gap is being narrowed. Urbanized blacks are now allowed relatively free movement within the country, and President Botha has directed a study to restructure the policy of "influx control."

Although all of the reforms noted are of extreme importance and show a willingness to make major changes, they do not address the crux of the problem--politics. In a speech to the National Party on August 15, 1985 Mr. Botha said,

the constitutional future of the black peoples in South Africa, is of such a nature that it must be determined in consultation with those concerned. We cannot confront them with certain final decisions. Over the years, that was exactly the criticism against our government--that we make decisions about people and not with them.⁵

This statement would indicate that Botha is fully aware of the heart of the problem. Each side, black and white, has already enunciated points that cannot be negotiated. The whites have rejected the idea of

one-man-one vote, because it would immediately lead to black domination and, in their opinion, chaos. President Botha has stated,

I am not prepared to lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide. Destroy white South Africa and our influence, and this country will drift into faction, strife, chaos and poverty.⁶

On the other hand, blacks will accept nothing less than meaningful political power. If meaningful negotiations are to take place, each side must recognize this and be prepared to accept these positions as a matter of fact.

Efforts to quicken and expand recent moves toward economic and social change, coupled with meaningful negotiations aimed at effective black participation in South African politics, will probably avert a civil war that would ultimately destroy the country.

Although there is agreement from both the conservatives and liberals in the United States that constructive engagement has come apart at the seams, a consensus on an alternate policy is nowhere in sight. Members of the liberal camp have been pushing for a policy of "constructive disengagement." They seek a policy that would impose economic sanctions against the government of South Africa and have even proposed total divestment, requiring United States firms to sell South African assets and cut all economic ties. They argue that a widespread exodus would shock the government into reform.

In order to prove their point they cite the fact that US economic sanctions on Chile, Uganda, and Rhodesia helped topple those governments. They further cite the international sports boycott, the threatened American Mineworkers Union coal boycott of 1974, and the Sullivan Principles as specific instances in South Africa where

international pressure has helped produce moderate change. Economic sanctions are professed to be the last chance to prevent violence from spreading across southern Africa.⁷

Toppling the present South African government is definitely not in the best interest of the United States. It would probably result in the destruction of the entire fabric of the only first-world economy on the continent and would have a severe impact on South Africa's third-world neighbors.

In a series of articles that criticized constructive engagement, the British Economist blasted those supporting disinvestment.

A deliberate action by one (rich) state to depress living standards in another (largely poor) one is scarcely defensible. It could be justified only in extreme circumstances for a specific goal not achievable by any other means short of war. The onus must surely be on the aggressor not only to prove the case for aggression but also to set out the steps by which aggression will achieve swift victory.

The American disinvestment lobby has fulfilled these requirements in only the vaguest terms. Confronted with the argument that disinvestment would not traumatise the apartheid economy, it switches to arguing that it would traumatise South African politics. Yet there is no more evidence for this thesis than for Mr. Crocker's opposing one, that a greater sense of external security will lead the Afrikaners to dismantle apartheid.⁸

Furthermore, "when South Africa has been previously isolated, it has a remarkable record for developing means of going it alone."⁹ Even though there is considerable United States investment in and trade with South Africa, economic relations with the United States are not indispensable to the South African government. South Africa has been diversifying its trade so that it is no longer dependent on any single country for imports, exports, or investment.

There is nothing to show that economic disinvestment will help blacks in South Africa. According to some noted black South Africans it would have exactly the opposite effect. The only real justification for disinvestment is that it will show some symbolic sympathy for blacks both in South Africa and in this country.

The incongruities, however, don't stop there. Petroleum produced by the Angolan subsidiary of Gulf Oil and exported to the United States provides the major source of financial support for Angola and her Cuban allies. In Mozambique, Arco, Shell and Exxon are involved in a major project to develop and produce oil, while Lehman Brothers is contracted to financially advise the Machel government. Howard Phillips, chairman of the conservative caucus said,

This is particularly shameful for this administration given its rhetoric on behalf of freedom fighters. They're clearly trying to develop a vested interest on the part of American banks and business in propping up the regime in Mozambique. It shows the basic split in the Republican Party between those who support freedom and those who are guided by the profit motive.¹⁰

There is also a great hue and cry from the liberals for an immediate move to the concept of one-man-one-vote in South Africa. This was recently expressed by Representative Timothy E. Wirth from the floor of the House when he stated:

It is time for the minority Government of South Africa to relinquish power to a democratic regime with full political rights for the blacks who make up the vast majority of the country's population. And it is certainly time for the Congress to legislatively encourage such a development.¹¹

There is no denying the fact that blacks have no voice in the national government. But South Africa is not the only African country that denies blacks the right to vote.

In a recent article about what black governments do to fellow blacks in Africa, Adam Wolfson, assistant editor of Policy Review, lists 42 African countries that "are all run by unelected regimes with no popular accountability."¹² He further stated that "over 85 percent of black Africa is disenfranchised."¹³ If there were a true concern for democracy, it seems there would be pressure for reform in the rest of Africa and black tyrants would not be immune from criticism. There appears to be a double standard.

The Honorable Gerald B. H. Solomon, United States Representative from New York, described this double standard as follows:

Our approach to countries that have not experienced a leftwing revolution emphasizes a historical necessity for change, an inexorable process must be set in motion leading to a fundamental change in the present situation. Once a country has experienced a so-called popular revolution however--a leftwing takeover--our new approach to that country emphasizes an implicit acceptance of the new tyranny and the new abuses committed in the name of revolution. Whether it be, for example, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, the new tyranny, the new repression must be accepted as a permanent fact of life.¹⁴

The liberals also recommend pressuring Pretoria to negotiate with all of the countries' black leaders, including an unconditionally freed Nelson Mandela. They even take this a step further as shown by the following statement of Senator Paul E. Tsongas:

We must widen our diplomatic perspective and make public contacts with nationalist groups and individuals opposing the government. Instead of quiet visits and backroom talks, United States diplomats should make clear our concern for banned groups and individuals. And, we should engage the African National Congress and other insurgent groups in discussions.¹⁵

It seems almost incomprehensible that a United States Senator would suggest circumventing and subverting the established democratic

government of South Africa by recognizing and giving legitimacy to a Communist backed terrorist organization. The ANC is presently bent on destroying moderate blacks and creating an atmosphere that will prevent a peaceful dismantling of apartheid.

The proposition of Senator Tsongas would only serve to lessen our ability to influence the South African government. President Botha has stated,

We have never given in to outside demands and we are not going to do so, South Africa's problems will be solved by South Africans and not by foreigners. We are not going to be deterred from doing what we think best, nor will we be forced into doing what we don't want to do. The tragedy is that hostile pressure and agitation from abroad have acted as an encouragement to the militant revolutionaries in South Africa to continue with their violence and intimidation. They have derived comfort and succor from this pressure. My government and I are determined to press ahead with our reform programme, and to those who prefer revolution to reform, I say they will not succeed no matter how much support and encouragement they derive from outside sources.¹⁶

President Reagan once said that South Africa was "a country that stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals."¹⁷ However, there has recently been a tendency to minimize the strategic importance of South Africa. Arguments concerning the importance of South African minerals focus on possible cut-offs in retaliation for economic sanctions by the United States and give the ready solutions of stockpiling, finding alternate resources, and recycling. This not only again exemplifies our tendency to focus on the near term, but shows that our focus is misdirected. The actual threat is permanent loss of these minerals to the Soviets.

South Africans are ridiculed and accused of crying wolf when they speak of a total communist onslaught. However, the Soviet goal toward South Africa has been expressed rather clearly on more than one occasion. Mr. Rod Bush, associate editor of Contemporary Marxism wrote:

Revolutionary change in South Africa will change not only the face of Southern Africa as a region, but also the balance of forces on the entire continent and among the core powers of the world system.¹⁸

President Brezhnev plainly stated the Soviet strategy: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends--the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa."¹⁹

The time has arrived for the United States to make a reassessment of its policy toward South Africa. The strategic importance of the country cannot be over emphasized. The Cape sea route is the energy lifeline of the West and the minerals and metals provided by South Africa are vital to the heavy industry and national defense of the United States and our allies. As we have seen, the Soviet Union is fully aware of this and is backing the African National Congress in hopes that the country will some day be in the hands of someone they could control.

It is imperative that the United States do everything possible to promote political stability and reduce armed conflict in the region. The time to act is before, not after, the Communists wage a war of liberation against the white South African regime.

The Congress and the administration have been operating under the false assumption that if enough outside pressure were applied, apartheid would come to a quick end. We have already seen that economic sanctions will not work and only serve to alienate the white minority and erode

American influence. The fact of the matter is that presence, not pressure, is the key to achieving change and preserving a staunch anti-Communist ally. We must be in a position to show all South Africans that we are not only opposed to apartheid, but committed to a process of peaceful change.

In order to achieve that change we must be willing to use, not deny, our vast economic resources to assist all parties in reaching a negotiated solution in South Africa.

All economic sanctions against South Africa should be lifted. The country should be treated as a member of the Western Bloc and assistance provided to improve the status of her armed forces with particular emphasis on building a formidable navy capable of patrolling the Cape sea route.

The United States business community should be encouraged to invest in South Africa and be required to adhere to the Sullivan Principles. Massive aid programs should be funded to help black South Africans improve their education in a wide range of fields. Loans should be made available to any business in South Africa that agrees to adhere to the stipulation of equal pay for equal work.

The United States should encourage moderate South African black leaders to engage in open discussions and actively work for peaceful change and power sharing.

Finally, we should attach no timetable nor have any preconceived notion of the form of power sharing that will be acceptable to both whites and blacks in South Africa.

There are no easy solutions in South Africa. The imposition of sanctions by the United States on South Africa will only continue to

reduce the minimum leverage we now possess. If we have learned anything from recent history, it is that the white South African minority will not give in to outside demands and hostility. We should do all within our power to promote growth in South Africa's economy and improve conditions for blacks. We can then use our influence to support reform measures that will move the country away from apartheid. There is still time for the United States to be the catalyst for positive change in South Africa. The time to act is now!

ENDNOTES

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